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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
As has been made clear in the opening briefs, the real parties 
in interest in this case are Reynold Q. Johnson, Jr., as the 
plaintiff/appellant and Steven C. Tycksen, Ruth Tycksen, Cheryl 
Burton, Mansell & Associates and Eric Heffner, as 
defendants/appellees. The other parties listed in the caption of 
the case have either been ordered out by the trial court or are 
defendant corporations that have no legal existence nor assets. 
In their briefs the appellees have raised certain new issues with 
respect to (a) the jurisdiction of the court; (b) the employment 
of the parol evidence rule; and (c) that certain issues were not 
raised at the trial court level, therefore cannot be raised on 
appeal. These new issues will be addressed in this Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINAL ORDER WAS DRAFTED BY THE DEFENDANTS; ANY 
AMBIGUITY IN THE DOCUMENT MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST THEM. 
The Notice of Appeal filed by the plaintiff herein (see copy 
attached to Docketing Statement) in part appeals from the order of 
the Second District Court granting summary judgment to the 
appellees. That order was entered on October 8, 1992 and states 
in Paragraph 1 thereof: 
Summery Judgment be entered in favor of all 
defendants. dismissing all causes of action against 
defendants in plaintiff's complaint, (emphasis added) 
(R-431) 
1 
Plaintiff submits that the other provisions of the Order 
notwithstanding this was a final order between plaintiff and "all 
defendants." What other interpretation can be made of this 
language? On its face, it is the final order and resolves all of 
plaintiff's claims against "all defendants." At the time when 
Judge Taylor signed the Order, the language of Paragraph 4 of the 
Order had already been complied with and the Amended Complaint had 
been filed on August 4, 1992 (R-314). Therefore, the language of 
Paragraph 4 was moot and meaningless. In addition, the corporate 
defendants are dissolved (R-307; 30) and have no assets and 
individually are not the real parties in interest. Further, since 
Paragraph 1 had dismissed all causes of action against defendants, 
who was there left in Paragraph 4 to be the "remaining defendants?" 
All of the defendants had been joined in the plaintiff's prior 
complaint and none were added by complying with Paragraph 4. 
Plaintiff submits that the Order is ambiguous and meaningless, and 
since the defendants drafted it, that the ambiguity must be 
construed against them and the Order deemed to be a final Order as 
that term is understood under Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure as set forth below: 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. 
An appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, or 
circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction 
2 
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, 
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice 
of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the 
time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but 
is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems approrpiate, which may include dismissal of the 
appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as 
the award of attorney fees. 
Utah Court Rules Annotated, Rule 3(a), P. 434. 
II. ORDER IS A FINAL ORDER. 
Plaintiff believe that the Order as written and signed is a 
final order, since the standing of the corporate defendants is not 
at issue nor are the corporations necessary parties as defined by 
the Utah Supreme Court when it said: 
. . . a necessary party is one whose presence is required 
for a full and fair determination of his rights as well 
as of the rights of the other parties to the suit. 
Cowan & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co. . 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Ut. 
1984) . The Court can take judicial notice of their defunct status. 
These are not contested facts (R-029 and 030 on Tebco and R-307 on 
Tebco Construction). In addition, their defunct status was proven 
before the trial court and not contested in the pleadings (R 450, 
Paragraph III) at the time when the Agreement (R 120-123) was 
presented to plaintiff in which they are purported to be the owners 
and sellers of the property. This Agreement is dated October 3, 
1985 and has been before the trial court as uncontested evidence 
since the initial complaint was filed. (See R 017-020). 
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Obviously a corporation, or corporations, cannot be 
represented other than by their officers. The representations of 
the officers is what is important and at issue and what was said 
and represented to plaintiff by said officers in the Agreement 
presented at the closing upon which the defendants rely. These 
officers are parties defendant. Therefore, it appears to the 
plaintiff that it is an exercise in futility to have to go back to 
the trial court to prove that the corporations recited in the 
"Agreement" (R 120-123) were in fact defunct at the time the 
Agreement was drafted by the defendants, when in fact these are 
uncontested facts before the Court. With respect to TEBCO, 
Incorporated, this was before the trial court as early as June 27, 
1986 (R-024) as part of plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to a 
motion to dismiss made by the defendants tycksen and Burton. With 
respect to TEBCO Construction, the issue of its defunct nature was 
raised in the initial complaint (R-005, paragraph 9) dated April 
24, 1986 and confirmed by a certificate of involuntary dissolution 
(R-307) dated March 31, 1986. The real issue is whether or not 
plaintiff was induced to sign both the "EMSA" (R 118-119) and the 
closing "Agreement," based upon the misrepresentations of the 
defendants, both oral and written in the documents themselves. As 
both documents have been part of the case since its inception, the 
issues were plainly before the trial court. Since the corporate 
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defendants are non-entities and do not exist, they cannot be in 
reality parties defendant since in order to exist a corporation 
must have a charter. Therefore, any reference to them in the final 
order of this court is meaningless and is null and void. 
III. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THAT STATEMENTS 
IN AN AGREEMENT ARE FALSE. 
The defendants misconstrue the application of the parol 
evidence rule. Plaintiff has not attempted to demonstrate anything 
other than the fact that the "Agreement" prepared by defendants (R 
120-123) had within it false statements of fact. (See Page 11 of 
Appellant's Brief) at the time it was prepared. It is a common 
fiat of the law that agreements are governed by the existing law 
of this state at the time they are entered into. Plaintiff submits 
that the statutes of the state were applicable to the Agreement 
from the time it was prepared and signed and the application of 
these statutes does not violate the principle of parol evidence. 
To argue otherwise would be to allow knowing persons to contract 
for unlawful and illegal purposes and claim the intercession of the 
Parol Evidence Rule when the innocent party sought to enforce the 
written agreement. In addition, if the application of statutory 
language could be deemed to be extrinsic or parol evidence, then 
the ruling of this court in Sparrow v. Tayco, 206 UAR 8 (Ut. App. 
1993) would allow it in. However, the real issue is not the 
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question of parol evidence, but whether or not the plaintiff was 
induced to sign the documents he signed based upon the 
misrepresentations made in the documents themselves, and then 
orally by the defendants. In addition, may the trial court look 
only to certain provisions of an agreement to the exclusion of 
others in making its decision? Plaintiff submits that the trial 
court must look to the arguments in their entirety in making its 
decision. Jones v. Hinckle, 611 P.2d 733 (Ut. 1980) and if the 
documents are full of errors, misstatements, and false facts, then 
they are null and void. Tanner v. District Judges, 649 P.2d (Ut. 
1982) . With respect to the EMSA, that document speaks for itself 
and contains the conditional language within it which was not met. 
IV. ALL ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT WERE RAISED BELOW. 
The defendants claim that plaintiff failed to raise certain 
issues in the court below pertaining to the EMSA (R-015) and the 
fact that plaintiff is not bound by the Agreement (R-017) because 
he was unable to judge the true construction of the same and had 
no opportunity for counsel. These two documents have been before 
the court in their entirety since the institution of the suit (see 
original Complaint). There is no ambiguity claimed in the 
respective documents; therefore, the intent of the parties is 
expressed in them and the court "must look to the agreement itself, 
in its entirety . . . " Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt 
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Lake Citv, 740 P.2d 1357 (Ut. App. 1987). Accordingly the EMSA 
contained more language in it than the language quoted by the 
defendants. Plaintiff submits that since the EMSA has been 
submitted to the trial court since the inception of the case, that 
the document in its entirety was before the court—including the 
paragraphs—posing conditions of its acceptance. With respect to 
the EMSA, the Supreme Court has said that the intentions of the 
parties is binding upon them and their intentions are found in 
their contract. John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 
743 P.2d 1205 (appeal after remand 795 P.2d 678) (Ut. 1987). The 
issue of the Ogden Housing Authority and its being a condition of 
the EMSA has been joined since the filing of the original complaint 
(R-001). On April 24, 1986, one of the allegations of fraud from 
the beginning has been that the defendants told plaintiff Johnson 
this provision of the EMSA had been met when in fact it had not. 
(R-003-004). Also see (R-439) where plaintiff raises the issue in 
dispute of the defendants1 alleged statement of facts, in 
plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. Also (R-445). Therefore 
this issue was clearly before the trial court. In addition, the 
question of plaintiff's visual inspection was also raised at (R-
452) in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to the defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Ogden Housing Authority issue is 
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also raised on the same page (R-452) . Likewise, the issue of 
plaintiff's inability to understand, judge properly, and seek legal 
advice on the Agreement he signed at closing was raised in 
plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment (see R-450; 442). Lastly, these issues were all 
raised in plaintiff's Affidavit (R-024) dated June 27, 1986. To 
say that these issues have not been raised before the trial court 
is to abandon the record. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the court is a final order as to all parties as 
that language is interpreted under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because the defendant corporations are non-
entities and are not real parties defendant. The actual parties 
are Reynold Q. Johnson, the Tycksens, Cheryl Burton, Mansell and 
Associates and Eric heffner. The order of the trial court resolves 
all of the matters as between them, therefore is an appealable 
order. The Parol Evidence Rule does not apply where the court is 
interpreting the language of the contracts themselves and applying 
statutory language to the contracts does not constitute parol 
evidence. In addition, the trial court has the authority to seek 
extrinsic evidence in its discretion in interpreting contracts if 
it feels the documents do not express the intent of the parties. 
All of the issues argued by plaintiff were clearly before the trial 
court, as found in the pleadings, the documents and the memoranda 
submitted. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff requests that 
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the summary judgment heretofore entered be vacated and the case 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Dated this 16th day of April, 1993. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
X^aham Dodd T 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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